INTRODUCTION
The Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) was introduced by Klemperer & Meyer in 1989 [8] .
The equilibrium concept assumes that producers submit bids simultaneously in a one-shot game. In the non-cooperative Nash Equilibrium, each producer commits to the supply function that maximizes his expected profit given the bids of the competitors and the properties of the uncertain demand. In 1992, Bolle [2] and Green & Newbery [5] observed that the set-up has many similarities with the organization of most electricity markets. Since then, the equilibrium is often used when modeling bidding behavior in electric power auctions. There are a few SFE papers with other applications. The model can be applied to any uniform price auction where valuations/costs are certain and common knowledge, quantity discreteness is negligible and demand is uncertain.
Klemperer & Meyer show that all smooth SFE are characterized by a differential equation, which in this paper is called the KM first-order condition. In the general case, there is a continuum of possible SFE that fulfill this first-order condition [8] . However, with capacity constraints one can often drastically reduce the set of SFE candidates [4] ; at least for inelastic demand. The set of SFE can be further reduced by allowing extreme demand outcomes, i.e. that there is a positive probability-it can be arbitrarily small-that the capacity constraints of all firms -but possibly the largest -bind. Then one can show analytically that there is a unique equilibrium in some specific cases. One case is symmetric producers with strictly convex cost functions [6] . The other is for producers with identical constant marginal costs and asymmetric capacities [7] . A reservation price, i.e. a price cap p , is needed to limit the equilibrium price.
Inelastic demand, a reservation price and the possibility of extreme demand outcomes, are all realistic assumptions for electric power markets, and especially so for balancing markets [6] .
But in reality, firms typically have both non-constant marginal costs and asymmetric production capacities. In this general case, the KM first-order conditions-one for each firmconstitute a system of non-autonomous ordinary differential equations. To analytically solve this system is very difficult and probably impossible. Baldick & Hogan [1] calculate approximate asymmetric SFE by numerically integrating the system of ordinary differential equations. They note that it is generally very difficult to find solutions that do not violate the requirement that supply functions must be non-decreasing 3 . The three exceptions are:
symmetric firms with identical cost functions, cases with affine solutions -i.e. affine marginal costs and no capacity constraints-and when there are small variations in the demand.
In this paper, I suggest, a new numerical algorithm to find a valid SFE. It is intended for N≥2 asymmetric firms and cost functions more general than the three special cases mentioned by Baldick & Hogan. The equilibrium consists of piece-wise smooth supply functions and is inspired by the unique equilibrium previously derived for asymmetric producers with constant marginal costs [7] . Some of the analytically derived properties are conjectured to be valid also for increasing marginal costs. These properties are: Large firms have more market power and have larger mark-ups for any percentage of the capacity. Hence, capacity constraints of smaller firms bind earlier. Let p i be the price at which the capacity constraint of firm i starts to bind.
Arrange the producers according to size, starting with the smallest firm. The capacity constraint of the second largest firm starts to bind at the price cap. Thus ( )
where C() is the aggregate cost function. The largest producer offers its remaining capacity N S ∆ with a perfectly elastic supply at the price cap. All firms offer their first unit of power at the lowest marginal cost, as if under Bertrand competition, which is in agreement with general results for uniform price auctions [9] .
To ensure an equilibrium with the conjectured properties, the following two assumptions are made. First, the larger of any two firms has weakly larger marginal cost for any percentage of the capacity 4 . Second, all firms has the same marginal cost at zero supply 5 
In practice, however, one has to be somewhat forgiving due to numerical errors. If there is a unique equilibrium, it can be found by an optimization algorithm minimizing Γ. 4 It might be enough to assume that the larger of any two firms has a weakly higher marginal cost for the last unit. It should be possible to numerically calculate asymmetric SFE for even more general cost functions. However, then adjustments of the conjecture might be needed, i.e. the order in which the capacity constraints bind. 5 It should be possible to numerically calculate asymmetric SFE also when firms have different marginal costs at zero demand, but then firms will offer their first units of power at different prices.
Section 2 introduces the notation and assumptions used in the analysis of this paper. The KM first-order conditions of the conjectured SFE are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, the numerical algorithm is applied to an example with three firms. The algorithm returns one solution that approximately fulfills the first-order condition and the non-decreasing requirement. It is graphically verified that no firm will find it profitable to deviate from the equilibrium candidate. The accepted production of the equilibrium is inefficient, because markups are asymmetric. The paper is concluded in Section 5.
NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
Except for firms' capacities and costs, the notation and market assumptions are the same as in previous papers by Holmberg [6, 7] . There are N asymmetric producers. Denote the inelastic demand by ε and its probability density function by f(ε). I assume that demand is always non-negative 6 . The density function is continuously differentiable and has a convex support set that includes zero demand. To get a unique equilibrium, extreme demand outcomes are allowed for, i.e. ε such that
occur with a positive probability 7 . In equilibrium this implies that the capacity constraints of all firms, but possibly the largest one, bind with a positive probability. The reservation price p ensures that the demand is zero above the price cap. Accordingly, the market price equals the price cap when , ε ε > if there are such demand outcomes. 6 As in [6] , it is straightforward to extend the analysis to negative demand, which is relevant for balancing markets. 7 Note that ( ) 
These assumptions are made to ensure an equilibrium with the conjectured properties. For more general cost functions, adjustments of the conjecture might be necessary.
The residual demand of an arbitrary producer i is denoted by q i (p,ε) . As long as the supply functions of his competitors are not perfectly elastic at p, his residual demand is:
THE CONJECTURED SFE
For symmetric producers [6] and producers with asymmetric capacities and identical constant marginal costs [7] , it has been shown that there is a unique equilibrium with the following properties:
• All producers offer their first units of power at the price ( )
• All supply functions are twice continuously differentiable, except at points where the capacity constraint of some producer starts to bind.
• There are no supply functions with perfectly elastic segments below the price cap and only the largest firm N can have a perfectly elastic segment at the price cap. This implies that all supply functions S i (p) are continuous below the price cap.
• Firms with non-binding capacity constraints do not have supply functions with inelastic segments.
• Below the price cap, all supply functions with non-binding capacity constraints fulfill the KM first-order condition.
• ( )
. 0
It is conjectured that these properties are true also for the asymmetric firms studied in this paper 8 . The conjecture is the basis of the numerical algorithm developed below.
Necessary conditions
Assuming that competitors do not have perfectly elastic supply functions below the price cap, the residual demand of an arbitrary producer i is given by (1) . Hence, for given demand and price, the profit of producer i is:
In the traditional SFE literature, see e.g. [8] , the KM first-order condition is derived by simply differentiating (2) with respect to p. 
for which all the endconditions are known, i.e.
( ) ( )
. and 
. The second-order condition can be checked graphically or numerically.
AN EXAMPLE WITH THREE ASYMMETRIC FIRMS
The numerical procedure to find valid SFE is illustrated by an example with three firms. Their production capacities are: , 7 
Necessary conditions
The KM first-order conditions of the SFE candidates corresponding to (4) are given by the following set of 2 systems of differential equations: 
Optimization algorithm
Numerical integration of first-order condition (System of ODE)

Numerical integration of first-order condition (System of ODE)
symmetric producers [1] . They observe, however, that for asymmetric producers the public signal assumption often leads to invalid SFE as in Fig. 3 . In this case, the supply functions violate several of the requirements, as supply functions should be both non-negative and nondecreasing.
To get an idea of the parameter space for which ( ) , 1 ,
Γ is calculated for a grid with 400x400 points in the space (
The result is presented as a contour plot in Fig. 4 . The difference may, however, be explained by the numerical sensitivity of the solution. If there is a unique SFE, which one would intuitively expect from previous SFE studies [6, 7] , then there is a unique set of { } As shown in a previous paper, the unique asymmetric equilibrium for constant marginal costs is piece-wise symmetric [7] . Two arbitrary producers have the same supply function, unless the capacity constraint of one of them is binding. With the strictly convex cost functions assumed in this paper, it will be more expensive for a smaller firm to produce a given supply 11 The fminsearch algorithm, a simplex search method of Matlab, was used in the calculation. 12 The estimation depends on tolerances used in the numerical integration.
compared to a larger firm. Thus it is expected that producers with more capacity sell more at every price, as in Fig. 5 . Still it is apparent that the largest firm uses his market power extensively. More than 40% of the capacity of producer 3 is not offered below the price cap.
Note that firm 2 and 3 have a kink in their supply functions at p 1 . A discontinuous increase in the elasticity of the supplies of firm 2 and 3 at this point ensures that the elasticity of their residual demand is continuous. It follows from the KM first-order condition that this is necessary, if the supply functions of firm 2 and 3 are to be continuous at p 1 . This corresponds to the KM first-order condition and seems to be true for every demand for all producers with non-binding capacity constraints. For such firms, one can deduce from the shape of the iso-profit lines that the profit is globally maximized at p X (ε). 
The second-order condition
Welfare loss
With symmetric cost functions, as in [6] , or asymmetric capacities and identical constant marginal costs, as in [7] , there is no inefficiency, as demand is inelastic and all firms operate at the same marginal cost. But there is a welfare loss, if marginal costs are increasing and large firms have larger mark-ups for every marginal cost, as in Fig. 5 . The production is inefficient, as some units with a high marginal cost will be accepted from small firms instead of cheaper production from larger firms. For the example with three firms, the welfare loss is illustrated in Fig. 9 .
In the example with three firms, the welfare loss is, relatively speaking, largest for the demand outcome ( ),
where the capacity constraint of firm 1 starts to bind. For higher demand, production from firm 2 and 3 that is cheaper than the most expensive generator of firm 1 is accepted, and the cost ratio decreases. There is another kink in the ratio, when the capacity constraint of firm 2 binds. The production is optimal when the whole capacity is needed, i.e. . The problem of inefficient production has lead von der Fehr & Harbord [3] to suggest that electric power markets should consider Vickrey auctions instead of uniform-price auctions. The advantage with the Vickrey auction is that it is optimal for producers to bid their true marginal costs, as they are offered an information rent.
CONCLUSIONS
Firms typically have non-constant marginal costs and asymmetric production capacities. In this general case, the first-order conditions of a Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) constitute a system of non-autonomous ordinary differential equations. Solving such a system analytically is very difficult and probably impossible. Nevertheless, it can be solved by numerical integration. There is one problem, however, electricity auctions normally require nondecreasing supply functions and it has been observed by Baldick & Hogan that numerically calculated asymmetric SFE:s tend to violate this restriction [1] . The three exceptions are:
In this paper a numerical procedure is suggested that can solve the problem of invalid asymmetric SFE. It is conjectured that the general asymmetric SFE has properties similar to those found in the case of constant marginal costs, which has been analyzed in [7] . The capacity constraints of small firms bind at lower prices compared to firms with a higher The procedure for finding asymmetric SFE candidates is illustrated by an example with three firms and linear marginal costs. Contour plots of Γ indicate that it has a unique minimum just above the marginal cost of the cheapest unit. This is expected as a numerical error would force the probably unique triple of SFE trajectories slightly off their track. Further, numerically calculated iso-profit lines indicate that no producer will find it profitable to unilaterally deviate from the SFE candidate. Thus the second-order condition seems to be fulfilled.
At the price, for which the capacity constraint of the smallest firm starts to bind, the elasticity of the supply of the two larger firms will increase discontinuously. This ensures that the elasticity of the residual demand of the two firms is continuous at p. Thus in equilibrium, all firms, but the smallest, will have kinks in their supply functions below their capacity constraint.
The numerical procedure could be generalized to any increasing and convex cost function and, with enough computer power, any number of firms. The procedure is more likely to generate valid SFE with the conjectured properties, if the larger of any two firms has weakly larger marginal cost for any percentage of the capacity and if all firms have the same marginal cost at zero supply. With adjustments in the conjectured properties, e.g. the order in which firms' capacities bind, it should be possible to apply the method to even more general cost functions.
For asymmetric firms with increasing marginal costs, asymmetric mark-ups imply inefficient production. The reason is that large firms have more market power. For every Econm., 1991.
APPENDIX
The numerical integration is performed in Matlab. It has been observed by Newbery that the coupled differential equations associated with SFE are stiff and highly sensitive to the starting point chosen for the numerical integration [10] . The example studied in this paper has the same problem. Thus a robust solver is used, the ode15s of Matlab with the backward differentiation option.
When using numerical integration algorithms, it is often necessary to rewrite the system of differential equations on the form ( ) ( ). 
M
The system can be rewritten on the following form: 
Summing over all equalities yields: 
